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Andreas Oschlies 7, Naomi E. Vaughan 8, Olivier Boucher 9,
Hauke Schmidt 10, Jim Haywood 11,12 & Jürgen Scheffran 13
Current mitigation efforts and existing future commitments are inadequate to accomplish the
Paris Agreement temperature goals. In light of this, research and debate are intensifying on
the possibilities of additionally employing proposed climate geoengineering technologies,
either through atmospheric carbon dioxide removal or farther-reaching interventions altering
the Earth’s radiative energy budget. Although research indicates that several techniques may
eventually have the physical potential to contribute to limiting climate change, all are in early
stages of development, involve substantial uncertainties and risks, and raise ethical and
governance dilemmas. Based on present knowledge, climate geoengineering techniques
cannot be relied on to signiﬁcantly contribute to meeting the Paris Agreement temperature
goals.
The Paris Agreement of the 21st UNFCCC Conference of Parties (COP21) in 2015 aimsto limit “the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C abovepre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above
pre-industrial levels”. Various measures are speciﬁed in support of this, including efforts
“to achieve a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of
greenhouse gases in the second half of this century”. To provide context, observations1 show that
the global mean surface temperature increase above pre-industrial levels, ΔTs, was about 1.1 °C
in 2015 and 2016, with El Niño contributing to the warming in these years, and about 1 °C in
2017, the warmest non-El Niño year on record.
Given that long-term global warming is simulated to scale approximately linearly with
cumulative CO2 emissions2, this leaves only limited remaining budgets of anthropogenic CO2
emissions until an atmospheric CO2 burden consistent with ΔTs = 1.5 °C or 2 °C is reached.
These budgets are uncertain and have proven challenging to compute3–5, as they depend on
several complicating factors, such as the climate sensitivity to the radiative forcing by CO2 and
the future relative roles of non-CO2 forcers, especially the intermediate and short-lived climate
forcers (SLCFs) including greenhouse gases like methane and ozone, and aerosol particles
containing soot, sulfate, and other components. Numerous approaches have yielded a wide range
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of remaining budget values for various temperature thresholds4.
The IPCC3 found that ΔTs remains below 1.5 °C in the 21st
century in 66% of Coupled Model Intercomparison Project phase
ﬁve (CMIP5) simulations with a cumulative CO2 budget of 400
Gt(CO2) from 2011 onwards, which includes the effects of con-
tinued emissions of non-CO2 forcers. For a ΔTs of 2 °C, the
corresponding remaining budget is 1000 Gt(CO2)3. At the current
global emissions rate of just over 40 Gt(CO2)/yr6, these 1.5 °C and
2 °C budgets would already be exhausted by 2020 and 2035,
respectively. In contrast, a recent analysis5 has suggested that the
remaining budgets may be much larger—possibly exceeding 880
Gt(CO2) and 1870 Gt(CO2) from 2015 onwards for 1.5 °C and 2 °
C, respectively, which would extend the time window to 2037 and
2062 at the current emissions rate. However, these higher values
involve numerous assumptions, including that ΔTs is currently
only 0.9 °C, implying a difference to 1.5 °C of 0.6 °C, which is at
the high end of the range of estimates based on observational
evidence7, as well as further assumptions such as extensive
additional mitigation of SLCFs.
In the context of the Paris Agreement, planned mitigation
efforts until 2030 are speciﬁed by the Nationally Determined
Contributions (NDCs), here also including the Intended NDCs
(INDCs) for parties which have not yet ratiﬁed the agreement.
Analyses of the current NDCs indicate that while emissions in
some regions of the world are likely to decrease in the coming
decade, total global anthropogenic CO2 emissions from 2015 to
2030 are likely to remain constant8, or even increase by ~1%/yr9.
Thus, given the estimated remaining budgets discussed above,
limiting ΔTs to 1.5 °C would very likely require much more
ambitious and rapid emissions reduction efforts than the current
NDCs. For the 2 °C goal, if the current NDCs were to be followed
until 2030, then a 66% probability of keeping ΔTs ≤ 2 °C has been
calculated to require a decrease of CO2 emissions of about 5%/yr
thereafter9. Such sustained reductions, proposed as a carbon law
of halving global CO2 emissions every decade10, would require
extensive efforts in the power, transport, agriculture and con-
sumer goods sectors, far exceeding the current and planned
efforts reﬂected in the NDCs. On the other hand, global warming
exceeding 1.5 °C, and especially exceeding 2 °C, is expected to
have highly detrimental consequences for societies and ecosys-
tems around the world11, requiring extensive and costly adapta-
tion measures, especially if low-probability, high-risk systemic
transitions (e.g., collapsing ice sheets) are triggered by the
increasing temperatures12,13.
Recognition of this impending challenge has given increased
momentum to often controversial discussions about two addi-
tional possible approaches to limiting climate change (Fig. 1):
removing greenhouse gases from the ambient atmosphere, par-
ticularly CO2 as the most important climate forcer; and inten-
tionally modifying the atmosphere-Earth radiative energy budget
to partly counteract unintended anthropogenic climate change.
These proposed approaches have been referred to collectively
under various names, including geoengineering, climate engi-
neering, and climate interventions14–17; here we use climate
geoengineering, i.e., geoengineering being done speciﬁcally for
climate-related purposes. Although none of the proposed tech-
niques exists yet at scales sufﬁcient to affect the global climate,
they have already taken up prominent roles in climate change
scenarios and policy discussions. In particular, extensive appli-
cation of techniques for removing CO2 from the atmosphere is
assumed in the widely used low-carbon RCP2.6 scenario18 of the
Representative Concentration Pathways used by the Inter-
governmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC). Furthermore, an
analysis19 of 116 scenarios which are consistent with limiting ΔTs
to below 2 °C found that 87% of the scenarios require a transition
to global net negative emissions, i.e., a CO2 removal rate
exceeding gross emissions, during the second half of this century.
In light of this situation, we assess the degree to which proposed
climate geoengineering techniques could contribute signiﬁcantly
to achieving the Paris Agreement temperature goals during this
century, which techniques can be largely disregarded in this
context, and what the main open issues and research needs are,
including the broader societal and political context.
Types, metrics and budgets of proposed techniques
Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) techniques (Fig. 1b) are generally
considered in terms of the cumulative amount or rate of CO2
removal from the atmosphere (Gt(CO2) or Gt(CO2)/yr), and
compared to the current burden, remaining budgets, or global
emissions of CO2. Most literature has focused on removal of CO2,
rather than SLCFs20, due to its larger burden and longer lifetime,
and thus comparatively slower response to mitigation efforts.
This focus is further supported by the low-carbon
RCP2.6 scenario18, wherein the emissions of the SLCFs
methane and black carbon are already assumed to decrease sig-
niﬁcantly, meaning further measures to reduce their emissions or
remove them from the atmosphere would have a limited addi-
tional effect21.
Efforts to modify the radiative energy budget of the atmosphere
and Earth’s surface (Fig. 1c) are generally discussed in terms of
reducing radiative forcing (in units of W/m2), deﬁned as the
change in the Earth’s net radiative energy balance at the tropo-
pause that would occur if one climate system variable were
changed while all other variables are held constant, while allowing
stratospheric temperatures to equilibrate2. Given this focus and
metric, we call this approach radiative forcing geoengineering
(RFG), which we deﬁne as the cooling term, i.e., the magnitude
of the negative radiative forcing. RFG and CDR are not entirely
independent, since each can have indirect effects on the other,
e.g., afforestation changes the surface albedo, while changes in
temperature and light due to RFG techniques could affect bio-
physical processes, and thus CO2 uptake by oceans and
ecosystems22–24.
To quantitatively assess the potential of CDR and/or RFG to
compensate for a shortfall in the reduction of emissions of climate
forcers, we start with emissions scenario data9 which is based on
the assumption that the current NDCs will be fulﬁlled by 2030,
and build on this with a parametric analysis (similar to ref. 25 but
starting with the NDCs rather than the RCP scenarios). Failure to
fulﬁl the NDCs—or mitigation in excess of the commitments—
would accordingly either increase or reduce the expected emis-
sions and gaps to speciﬁc targets, as illustrated in one parametric
scenario with extensive mitigation starting already in 2021. Fig-
ure 2 and Supplementary Table 1 shows results for a range of
annual decrease rates for CO2 emissions (see the Methods section
for assumptions and computations).
Following the NDCs from 2015 to 2030 would result in
cumulative emissions of 700 ± 37 Gt(CO2). This would already
exceed our estimate of the remaining CO2 budget for the 1.5 °C
goal, which is 650 ± 130 Gt(CO2) (see Methods). Even if a
decrease rate of 3%/yr were to start in 2021, the cumulative
emissions by 2030 would be ~600 Gt(CO2), requiring near-zero
CO2 emissions thereafter to achieve the 1.5 °C goal without
invoking CDR or RFG. Achieving the 2 °C goal by mitigation
alone (i.e., requiring no emissions gap in 2100) would also be
highly challenging, requiring fulﬁlling the current NDCs by 2030
and reducing emissions by over 5%/yr thereafter, or reducing
CO2 emissions by more than 3%/yr starting already a decade
earlier in 2021.
Deﬁning clear threshold values for CDR and RFG techniques
to be relevant for future climate policy is difﬁcult due to a
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strong dependence on future emissions pathways. However,
in the context of the Paris Agreement, useful reference values
can be deﬁned based on the difference between the 2 °C versus
the 1.5 °C limits (see Methods): CDRref ≈ 650 Gt(CO2) for
the cumulative CO2 budget, and RFGref ≈ 0.6 W/m2 for the
equivalent radiative forcing. These reference values help
provide orientation for the range of cases considered in Fig. 2
and Supplementary Table 1: they correspond to most of the
gap in remaining emissions for the 1.5 °C limit in the case with a
5%/yr emissions reduction after 2030, and likewise for the 2 °C
limit in the case of a 3%/yr reduction rate after 2030. In
contrast, for the 1%/yr case these reference values only ﬁll 38%
of the gap to the 2 °C limit, and only 27% of the gap to the 1.5 °C
limit. In these cases, a single technique would need to sub-
stantially exceed CDRref or RFGref, or a portfolio of techniques
would be needed, each providing CDRref or RFGref or a signiﬁcant
fraction thereof.
Below we discuss the scalability and design challenges for any
CDR or RFG technique to reach these values. While technical
challenges are hereafter the main focus, we recognize that they
cannot be viewed in isolation from the signiﬁcant ethical, legal,
political, and other social aspects that arise when discussing
climate geoengineering, and provide an overview of these
aspects in Box 1.
Carbon dioxide removal
Numerous CDR techniques have been proposed (Fig. 1) and the
surrounding literature indicates that some CDR techniques could
contribute signiﬁcantly to achieving net zero or net negative CO2
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Fig. 1 Proposed climate geoengineering techniques focused on in this review, placed in the context of mitigation efforts. a Mitigation is deﬁned here as
reducing the amount of CO2 and other climate forcers released into the atmosphere by either reducing the source activities (e.g., less energy
consumption), increasing efﬁciency (thus reducing emissions per unit of the activity, e.g., kWh of energy produced), or removing forcers like CO2 directly
at the source prior to their emission, e.g., from the concentrated stream of CO2 at power or industrial plants. For the latter, the captured CO2 can either be
stored subsurface (CCS—carbon capture and storage), or utilized in long-lived materials such as carbonate-based cement (CCU—carbon capture and
utilization). b In contrast to mitigation (including CCS and CCU), carbon dioxide removal (CDR) aims to reduce the amount of CO2 after it has been
emitted into the ambient atmosphere, thus reducing greenhouse warming due to the absorption of terrestrial radiation (red arrows). The main proposed
techniques are based on uptake of CO2 either by photosynthesis (techniques 1–5) or by abiotic chemical reactions (techniques 6 and 7), followed by
storage of the carbon in various biosphere or geosphere reservoirs. c Radiative forcing geoengineering techniques aim to modify the atmosphere-surface
radiative energy budget in order to partly counteract global warming, by two distinct approaches: increasing the amount of solar shortwave radiation
(yellow arrows) that is reﬂected back to space (techniques 8, 9, 11, and 12), or increasing the amount of terrestrial longwave radiation which escapes to
space (technique 10). The focus of this class of techniques is on inducing a negative radiative forcing (i.e., cooling). Thus, in place of the commonly used
misnomers solar radiation management (SRM) and albedo modiﬁcation14,15,17, which focus only on the solar radiation techniques and exclude terrestrial
radiation modiﬁcation by cirrus cloud thinning, we introduce the term radiative forcing based climate geoengineering, which we abbreviate to radiative
forcing geoengineering (RFG)
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emissions15,16,26–29. While it is possible that CDR, together
with mitigation, could eventually return atmospheric CO2 to
previous levels, this would only partially return the climate and
other Earth system parameters, such as ocean pH, to the corre-
sponding previous state, due to hysteresis and other effects30,31.
Here we examine the potential contributions of CDR towards
achieving the Paris Agreement goals, and the challenges that
would be faced, complementing previous analyses which have
focused on issues like the assumed role of CDR in low-carbon
scenarios18,19, or the ability to compensate sectors that are par-
ticularly difﬁcult to mitigate (e.g., air travel, agriculture and cer-
tain industries).
Several CDR techniques have been developed as prototypes,
and afforestation is already in widespread use, as are some of the
components involved in other techniques, e.g., bioenergy (in
BECCS). However, all of these are far from the scale of CDRref.
Attempting to scale up any CDR technique would require
addressing many technical and social issues, several of which are
common across most or all of the techniques. One of the most
important common technical issues is the total CO2 storage
capacity (see Box 2). Further issues include limits of required
chemical and biological resources, how the techniques would
compete with each other and other sectors for resources, the time
scales involved, and the economic costs and societal impacts (see
Box 1).
Biomass-based techniques. Numerous biomass-based CDR
techniques have been proposed, all removing CO2 from the
atmosphere by photosynthesis. Some then use the biomass for
primary carbon storage (e.g., in trees, humus, peat, etc.), while
others involve combustion and subsequent storage of the pro-
ducts (e.g., compressed CO2 and biochar).
Afforestation (here also including reforestation) involves
increasing forest cover and/or density in previously non-
forested or deforested areas. Principally the carbon storage
potential is large compared to CDRref, given that historic
deforestation was 2400±1000 Gt(CO2)16. However, since much
of this deforestation was to make space for current agriculture
and livestock, extensive land-use competition could be expected
for such a degree of afforestation32. More realistic estimates
therefore range from about 0.5–3.5 Gt(CO2)/yr by 2050,
increasing to 4–12 Gt(CO2)/yr by 210027,28,33, implying a total
removal potential of about 120–450 Gt(CO2) from 2015 to 2100
(assuming linear increases in the CO2 uptake rate, starting at zero
in 2015).
Combining biomass energy with carbon capture and storage
(BECCS), which can be used for either electricity generation or
the production of hydrogen or liquid fuels34, is widely assumed in
integrated assessment model scenarios to be able to provide
sufﬁcient CDR to keep ΔTs below 2 °C
18,19. The range of
estimates of the maximum removal potential of BECCS is large,
again partly based on assumptions about land-use competition
with agriculture, economic incentives for extensive development
and deployment, and other factors, such as nature conservation.
High-end estimates for BECCS in the literature involve under-
lying assumptions such as the use of forestry and agriculture
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Fig. 2 Gaps to the Paris Agreement temperature goals. The emissions gaps [Gt(CO2)] between computed cumulative CO2 emissions between 2015 and
2100 and the remaining budgets to the cumulative emissions amounts that keep ΔTs below 1.5 °C (green line) and 2 °C (blue line) with a 66% likelihood
are shown for several scenarios. The remaining budgets are based on data from an IPCC analysis of model ensemble output3, yielding 650 ± 130 Gt(CO2)
to 1.5 °C and 1300 ± 130 Gt(CO2) to 2 °C. The ﬁrst four scenarios are based on fulﬁlment of the Paris Agreement NDCs by 2030 and various rates of
annual emissions reductions thereafter. The last scenario is for an annual emissions reduction rate of 3%/yr starting already in 2021. The shading
represents the lower and upper bound values computed for each temperature goal, and the solid line is the mean of these. The right side axis shows the
implied negative radiative forcing [W/m2] associated with the CO2 budget gap values, using a conversion factor of 9.6 x 10–4 (W/m2)/(Gt(CO2). For
further information and computations, see Methods and Supplementary Table 1
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residues35, the transition to lower meat diets, and the diversion of
over half the current nitrogen and phosphate fertilizer inputs to
BECCS, resulting in an uptake of ~10 Gt(CO2)/yr by 205032,33,
with estimates for 2100 being similar or possibly even higher27,36.
This would also depend on the development of both bioenergy
and carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies, infrastruc-
tures, and governance mechanisms to allow a capacity several
orders of magnitude greater than current prototypes37–39.
Assuming a linear development to 10 Gt(CO2)/yr until 2050
and constant thereafter would imply a cumulative removal
potential by 2100 of ~700 Gt(CO2), i.e., exceeding CDRref.
Various factors may reduce this, but it could also increase under
the high-end assumptions mentioned above.
Biochar, a stable form of carbon produced by medium
temperature pyrolysis (>350 °C) or high temperature gasiﬁcation
(~900 °C) of biomass in a low oxygen environment, can be buried
or ploughed into agricultural soils, enriching their carbon
content. Various gases or oils can also be produced by the
pyrolysis process. While biochar production could principally be
applied to a similar amount of biomass as assumed for BECCS
(i.e., ~700 Gt(CO2) removal by 2100), many additional factors
come into play40,41, including feedstock type and source, labile
carbon fraction, char yield, required energy input, the mean soil
residence time of the biochar carbon, sink saturation, and
priming effects (i.e., accelerated organic matter decomposition).
This results in a much lower estimated maximum removal
potential for biochar, ~2–2.5 Gt(CO2)/yr28,41, or up to ~200 Gt
(CO2) by 2100, although, as with BECCS, this could possibly be
enhanced by additional use of residue biomass from agriculture
and forestry41.
In addition to mixing biochar into soils, recent studies have
focused on replenishing or enhancing organic carbon in
cultivated soils through various agricultural practices42, such as
limiting tilling, and composting (rather than burning) crop
residues. While these ideas are generating considerable interest,
including the COP21 4 per mille initiative43,44, their ability to be
scaled up to being relevant for the Paris Agreement is poorly
known, due to saturation and other effects. Earlier studies45
suggested a very limited possible role for soil enrichment;
however, more recent analyses suggest a physical removal
potential of ~200 Gt(CO2) by 210041, i.e., a signiﬁcant fraction
of CDRref, and this could possibly be increased up to 500 Gt(CO2)
by practices such as soil carbon enrichment at greater depths43,44.
Soil carbon enrichment may be more closely associated with co-
beneﬁts for agriculture than with trade-offs like competition for
biomass, so that it might be seen as particularly attractive to
pursue in the near term, while trade-offs and similar issues with
other techniques are being resolved.
Box 1: Socio-political dimensions and governance issues
The signiﬁcant ethical, legal, political and other social questions raised by hypothetical climate geoengineering interventions have been at the centre of
attention since the early stages of the debate148,161. For instance, while a highly visible editorial on stratospheric aerosol injection (SAI) in 2006 (ref.81)
discussed whether it might be a “contribution to resolve a policy dilemma”, the ﬁrst major assessment report dedicated to climate geoengineering in
2009 (ref.14) pointed out in contrast that SAI and other forms of climate geoengineering are themselves likely to lead to further policy dilemmas.
This discourse has been primarily framed around the concept of moral hazard26,162,163—would climate geoengineering provide a false sense of
insurance, potentially thwarting efforts to reduce emissions, and thus working counter to the Paris Agreement? Another frequently raised concern is a
possible slippery slope dynamic164, in which research and vested interests are seen as precluding adequate independent assessment and appropriate
consideration of alternatives. The moral hazard and slippery slope concerns have mostly been voiced with regard to RFG, but also apply to CDR. For
example, the inclusion of large amounts of CDR in the low-carbon RCP2.6 scenario18 decreases the amount by which emissions need to be reduced to
achieve the 2 °C target in computer models, by allowing for an overshoot that is assumed can later be compensated via a presently largely conceptual
system of CDR technologies (a moral hazard). Following this pathway may increasingly lock in this technology option, crowding out other possible
options (a slippery slope).
At present it is unclear whether any climate geoengineering technology could be implemented in a way that accounts for distributive, intergenerational,
corrective, ecological, procedural and other forms of justice165. Furthermore, it has been argued that development and eventual deployment of climate
geoengineering techniques, especially RFG, may place strains on human security and international relations166, resulting in conﬂict risks and societal
instability167,168. A geoengineered climate would be the result of an intentional intervention attributable to identiﬁable actors, as opposed to the more
ambiguous distribution of responsibility for damages from climate change induced by emissions of CO2 and other climate forcers. Thus a dynamic
might unfold in which political tensions due to assigning and contestating blame for climate-related damages, such as those from extreme weather
events, are exacerbated. The difﬁculties associated with detecting and attributing the effects of deployment of RFG may thereby lead to increased
conﬂict potentials over liability and compensation169,170, questioning the very possibility of effective governance once deployment is under way169.
These concerns emphasize the importance of early development of effective governance for research and possible future deployment of climate
geoengineering techniques. Outdoor ﬁeld testing of RFG has particularly been met with calls for governance beyond the scientiﬁc and technical aspects
and associated risks commonly focused on for such experimentation in other contexts161,171–173. Governance concerns apply to both RFG and CDR. For
BECCS, for instance, governance and monitoring would be needed to minimize possible adverse effects that growing bioenergy crops would have on
land and water use, and on food production and biodiversity (due to large scale monocultures). Furthermore, generally for any CDR method, the robust
quantiﬁcation and reliable reporting of removed CO2 would be essential174.
While some have called for governance via a single treaty that addresses all aspects of climate geoengineering (or CDR and RFG individually), others
ﬁnd this prohibitively difﬁcult and argue for further developing existing instruments (ref.15 and citations therein). Some existing governance mechanisms
apply at local, national and international levels, for example in the form of environmental regulation, professional norms, research funding procedures
such as peer review and impact assessments, and international agreements175. In particular, land-based CDR methods are to some extent addressed in
the Kyoto mechanisms (Clean Development Mechanism, Joint Implementation, and Emissions Trading). However, these mechanisms are contested due
to concerns about accounting difﬁculties, risk of fraud, and lack of efﬁciency. Thus far, two multilateral treaty bodies, the London Convention/London
Protocol (LC/LP) and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), have directly addressed different types of climate geoengineering by issuing
speciﬁc resolutions and decisions. The LC/LP has put in place restrictions on large scale deployment of marine geoengineering activities, while the CBD
requests that “no climate-related geo-engineering activities that may affect biodiversity take place”, a decision that is non-binding upon treaty parties.
Furthermore, it has been suggested that the UNFCCC could contribute to regulating individual techniques or aspects of climate geoengineering176,
which may become an issue in the implementation of the Paris Agreement. An important ﬁrst step towards developing governance has been
proposals15,177 for applying overarching principles for guiding the research community and policymakers, including the principles of precaution and
transparency, and considering research as a public good; these could be considered for formal adoption, e.g., by national and international funding
bodies.
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Ocean iron fertilization (OIF) is the proposal to fertilize iron-
poor regions of the ocean to spur phytoplankton growth
and increase the detritus carbon ﬂux to the deep ocean46.
The general conclusion emerging from modelling work, pertur-
bative ﬁeld studies, and analyses of natural iron enrichments
downstream of islands, is that some oceanic carbon uptake could
likely be achieved, particularly in the iron-limited Southern
Ocean46. However, while early studies indicated that CO2
removal by OIF might be capable of far exceeding CDRref,
later studies showed that this neglected many limiting factors,
so that the removal capacity is likely less than 400 Gt(CO2)
by 210047. Furthermore, this would likely result in signiﬁcant
side effects in the oceans, like disruption of regional nutrient
cycling, and on the atmosphere, including production of climate-
relevant gases like N2O15. Although there are reasons to
encourage further research48, the limited removal potential and
signiﬁcant side effects, along with international legal develop-
ments that restrict large-scale deployment (see Box 1), make it
unlikely that OIF will be employed to contribute signiﬁcantly
to the Paris Agreement goals. It seems similarly unlikely that
related ocean carbon cycle techniques, such as using wave-driven
pumps to enhance oceanic upwelling and thus increase the rate of
mixing of fresh CO2 into deep-ocean waters, will contribute
signiﬁcantly49.
Box 2: Carbon storage capacity and achievability
CO2 removal methods require adequate storage reservoirs, either directly for CO2 or for other forms of carbon (e.g., biomass, minerals and consumer
products). A variety of reservoirs are possible, either quasi-permanent, conﬁdently isolating CO2 from the atmosphere over long timescales (e.g.,
>10,000 years178), or temporary, where a non-negligible amount of the removed CO2 might return to the atmosphere within decades to centuries179.
The achievability for nearly all reservoirs is qualitatively estimated (see Figure below) to be relatively high for small amounts (e.g., <1 Gt(CO2)), but
challenging for larger amounts (e.g., >1000 Gt(CO2)), with considerable research needed, e.g., into ecological and economic implications, and
development of adequate infrastructures for extensive deployment. For storage in the deep oceans, however, even relatively small amounts are likely to
be challenging, given a lack of applicable practical experience. Deep-ocean storage, mainly via injection of liqueﬁed CO2 into deep-ocean waters and
seabed sediments180, is mostly considered temporary, since ocean circulation will return some of the CO2 to the atmosphere181. However, this occurs
on timescales that are much longer than relevant for initial achievement of the Paris Agreement, with model simulations showing that for a CO2
discharge depth of 3000m, slightly less than half of the CO2 would return to the atmosphere within 500 years182. The capacity for deep-ocean storage
depicted in the Figure is based on a recent analysis179 and far exceeds CDRref.
Geological and geochemical storage capacity is considered large and quasi-permanent178,179. The main approach to geological storage is injection of
CO2 (usually compressed as a supercritical ﬂuid), via boreholes, into deep porous rock formations like oil and gas reservoirs and deep saline formations
overlain by sealing layers37. Challenges include the lack of adequate geological data in some regions, as well as the trade-offs between efforts to co-
locate CO2 capture sites and injection sites versus the development of CO2 pipelines and ship transport networks183. Enhanced weathering techniques
apply geochemical storage, reacting CO2 with alkaline minerals, on either the land or ocean surface, and subsequently storing the weathering
products55. Storage would likely be limited by logistical requirements (mining and transport) and ecological impacts rather than by mineral rock
resource availability. Efforts are being made to combine geochemical storage with geological storage via in situ mineralization of liquid CO2 injected into
boreholes with geochemical conditions conducive to rapid mineralization reactions184, but considerable work is needed to determine how well this
could be scaled up to tens or hundreds of Gt(CO2).
Biosphere-based carbon stores in trees and soils are limited in total capacity179, though both likely exceed CDRref, with the storage capacity of soils
estimated to be a few times larger than that of forests. Afforestation and soil carbon enrichment (e.g., terra preta) are well-established processes, and
would be technically easier to implement in the near-term than geological and geochemical storage; however, these would compete against global
trends of deforestation and top-soil degradation and loss. Challenges would likely grow rapidly at larger scales, with issues like land use competition,
irrigation and fertilizer supply limits becoming increasingly signiﬁcant32. In both cases, the biomass storage is temporary on timescales relevant to the
Paris Agreement, and sustained ecosystem maintenance would be needed to prevent carbon from being returned to the atmosphere through changes in
the local environment (e.g., disease), climate (e.g., drought, ﬁre) or society (e.g., changing land use).
Carbon capture and utilization (CCU) could also be considered a form of storage reservoir. While products such as liquid fuels or polyurethane foams
would return CO2 to the atmosphere via combustion or decay within years to decades, some products like construction materials could sequester CO2
for centuries. However, even with extensive policy and market support actions, the removal potential is likely less than 10 Gt(CO2) by 2100185.
Finally, it is important to bear in mind that even small amounts of carbon storage in some reservoirs may be very difﬁcult or even unachievable if
societal and political support is lacking.
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Many further biomass-based CDR techniques have been
proposed, such as accelerating the formation of peatlands, or
burying timber biomass in anoxic wetlands. A recent assess-
ment15 has concluded that the expected CO2 removal capacity for
each of these would likely be less than 100 Gt(CO2) by 2100, and
several would have signiﬁcant environmental side effects. Further
research may reveal greater CO2 removal potentials, but current
literature indicates that none would be capable of signiﬁcantly
contributing to achieving the Paris Agreement goals.
The biomass-based techniques share a wide range of research
needs (Fig. 3), which are relevant to their possible roles in the
Paris Agreement context, and can be grouped under three broad
categories: (1) the technical carbon removal potential and how
this can be increased; (2) social and environmental impacts and
how trade-offs can be minimized while capitalizing on co-beneﬁts
and synergies; and (3) development and operational costs. Given
the current state of research and development, it is not yet
possible to generally prioritize any of these categories above the
others, although this may be possible in dedicated studies of
individual techniques. Several technique-speciﬁc aspects of the
ﬁrst two categories were discussed above.
For the third category, estimating development and operational
costs has been particularly challenging, despite their importance
in determining whether any technique could viably contribute to
climate policy around the Paris Agreement. Published values for
all of the techniques discussed above can presently only be taken
as broadly indicative, and are typically of the order of $100/t
(CO2), with the range of values given in the literature for each
technique often being a factor of three or more27,28. This
uncertainty is due to numerous factors, including extremely
limited commercial experience with full-scale operations (e.g., for
CCS or biochar), storage site properties and the details of CO2
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Fig. 3 Schematic of research needs for proposed biomass-based CDR techniques. A broad range of issues would need to be clariﬁed to better understand
the removal potentials, costs, trade-offs and risks prior to a possible implementation of any biomass-based CDR technique, as detailed in two recent
assessments15,16, including: (1) the most effective biomass types to use for various techniques; (2) the applied technologies, especially for carbon capture
and biomass pyrolysis; (3) the scalability, noting that modest deployment levels of biomass-based techniques could largely be constrained to local
environmental and socio-economic impacts, while extensive deployment (e.g., at levels comparable to CDRref) could result in signiﬁcant limitations due to
land and biomass availability, biomass growth rates, and competition, e.g., for water and nutrient resources, with natural ecosystems, agriculture, and other
biomass-based CDR techniques; (4) impacts of choices of biomass types and the extent of implementation on regional biodiversity, wildlife, and overall
ecosystem resilience; (5) impacts of differences in the albedo of the respective biomass type (e.g., trees and energy crops) versus the albedo prior to the
biomass growth; (6) the carbon payback, i.e., the temporary reduction in effectiveness of a terrestrial biomass CDR technique resulting from CO2 released
due to disturbances to the ecosystem during biomass planting; (7) implications of the production of numerous non-CO2 gases with impacts on climate and
air quality, such as volatile organic compounds (VOCs) like isoprene, and the long-lived greenhouse gas N2O; (8) the ability to co-locate biomass
processing sites (BECCS plants and biochar pyrolysis facilities) with biomass growth locations and product storage and/or burial sites, as well as the
necessary transport infrastructure if these are not co-located; (9) economic implications – not only the operational costs, but also the economic impacts,
e.g., due to competition with agriculture
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transport or co-location of infrastructure for BECCS, land-use
and resource competition with agriculture, and the compensating
revenue from electricity or fuels produced by BECCS and biochar
plants36. Complicating things further, land and resource
competition might result in operational costs for biomass-based
CDR techniques actually increasing as implementation scales
grow, in contrast to the typical falling costs for most technologies
as they grow in scale.
Mineralization-based and other abiotic techniques. Abiotic
CDR techniques for removing CO2 from the atmosphere can be
roughly distinguished into two main approaches: spreading
weathering materials over large open spaces (enhanced weath-
ering and ocean alkalinisation/liming); and capturing CO2 in
some form of enclosure or on constructed machinery (direct air
carbon capture and storage, abbreviated DACCS).
A review of proposals for terrestrial enhanced weathering50
divides these into (1) ex situ techniques, which involve dispersing
mined, crushed and ground silicate rocks (e.g., olivine51,52) in
order to increase the exposed surface area and thus allow a more
rapid uptake of CO2, particularly in warm, humid regions where
CO2 removal would be most rapid52, and (2) in situ techniques,
which are forms of underground geological/geochemical seques-
tration (see Box 2). Similarly, ocean alkalinization has been
proposed via distribution of crushed rock into coastal surface
waters53, as slowly sinking micrometre-sized silicate particles
deposited onto the open-ocean sea surface54,55, or via dispersion
of limestone powder into upwelling regions56. Ocean alkaliniza-
tion would contribute to counteracting ocean acidiﬁcation, in
turn allowing more uptake of CO2 from the atmosphere into the
ocean surface waters. Terrestrial enhanced weathering could also
enhance ocean alkalinity, via either riverine run-off, or mechan-
ized transport and mixing of the alkaline weathering products
into the oceans, though both may vary strongly regionally.
Further proposals include combining enhanced weathering and
ocean alkalinisation using silicates to neutralize hydrochloric acid
produced from seawater57, or heating limestone to produce lime
(combined with capture and storage of the by-product CO2),
which has been a long-standing proposal for dispersal in the
oceans to increase ocean alkalinity58, in turn allowing additional
CO2 uptake from the atmosphere by the ocean.
Due to the abundance of the required raw materials, the
physical CO2 removal potential of enhanced weathering is
principally much larger than CDRref. However, since the current
rate of anthropogenic CO2 emission is ~200 times the rate of CO2
removal by natural weathering59, the surface area available for
reactions would need to be increased substantially via grinding
and distribution of the weathering materials. This would imply
large investments, including energy input, for the associated
mining, grinding and distribution operations. Given that remov-
ing a certain mass of CO2 requires a similar mass of weathering
material, the operations would need to be comparable to other
current mining and mined-materials-processing industries, which
could have signiﬁcant impacts on sensitive ecosystems, as could
the large amounts of alkaline weathering products that would be
produced, especially in the runoff regions, about which very little
is presently known.
DACCS could possibly be designed so that it requires a
substantially reduced dedicated land or marine surface area
compared to other CDR techniques, and might also allow the
environmental impacts to be more limited and quantiﬁable.
However, scaling up from small-scale applications of direct air
capture technologies, such as controlling CO2 levels in submar-
ines and spaceships60,61, to removing and storing hundreds of Gt
(CO2) would involve substantial costs, especially due to the high
energy requirements of three main technology components: (1)
sustaining sufﬁcient airﬂow through the systems to continually
expose fresh air for CO2 separation; (2) overcoming the
thermodynamic barrier required to capture CO2 at a dilute
ambient mixing ratio of 0.04%; and (3) supplying additional
energy for the compression of CO2 for underground storage.
While components (1) and (3) can be quantiﬁed using basic
principles, and several studies61,62 indicate that combined they
would probably require 300–500MJ/t(CO2) (or ~80–140 kWh/t
(CO2)), the energy and material requirements of the separation
technology (2) are much more difﬁcult to estimate. The
theoretical thermodynamic minimum for separation of CO2 at
current ambient mixing ratios is just under 500MJ/t(CO2)62.
However, thermodynamic minimum values are rarely achievable.
Current estimates for the efﬁciency of DACCS are technology-
dependent, ranging from at best 3 to likely 20 or more times the
theoretical minimum61, or ~1500–10,000 MJ/t(CO2), implying
that removing an amount equivalent to CDRref by 2100 would
require a continuous power supply of approximately
400–2600 GW. Combined with the energy requirements for (1)
and (3) (equivalent to about 100 GW), this represents about
20–100% of the current global electricity generation of
~2700 GW.
A wide range of chemical, thermal, and also some biological
(algae and enzymes) techniques have been proposed for the
separation technology, but the focus of research has been on two
main approaches60,62–65: adsorption onto solids, e.g., amine-
based resins that adsorb CO2 when ambient air moves across
them, followed by release of concentrated CO2 by hydration of
the resins in an otherwise evacuated enclosure; and absorption
into high-alkalinity solutions with subsequent heating-induced
release of the absorbed CO2. While the environmental and
societal impacts of these technologies could likely be much better
constrained in comparison to the other CDR techniques, they are
still important to consider, and include environmental impacts
due to placement of the capture devices and CO2 storage sites,
mining and preparation of materials like resins that would be
used in the systems, and the possible release of amines and other
substances used in the separation process66.
The physical CO2 removal potential of DACCS far exceeds
CDRref, provided the high energy requirements could be met;
there are no signiﬁcant principal limitations in terms of the
material availability or CO2 storage capacity (see Box 2), and even
the manufacture of millions of extraction devices annually would
not be unfeasible (compared to, e.g., the annual global
manufacturing of over 70 million automobiles). Large invest-
ments in DACCS might, however, be unlikely as long as large
point sources (e.g., power or industrial plants) continue to be
built and operated, since the same effective reduction of
atmospheric CO2 levels via CCS applied to higher-
concentration sources will generally be much less energy intensive
and thus less expensive than CO2 capture from ambient air61. In
general, for any possible longer-term application of CDR in
climate policy, a major lynchpin will likely be development of
CCS, both in terms of the carbon capture technologies and the
storage infrastructure, since CCS is fundamental to both BECCS
and DACCS, and since it is likely to be most economically
favourable to ﬁrst apply CCS to remaining large point sources.
The estimated development and operational costs for both
enhanced weathering (including ocean alkalinisation) and
DACCS at scales comparable to CDRref vary widely, even though
the involved processes, especially for enhanced weathering
(mining, processing and distribution), are nearly all well-
established industrial activities. Published estimates cover a
similar range to the biomass-based techniques, from about $20/
t(CO2) to over $1000/t(CO2)27,28,60,65. Better estimates of the
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costs are particularly important for DACCS, since it essentially
represents the cost ceiling for viability of any CDR measure due
to its potential scalability and its likely constrainable environ-
mental impacts. These potentially high costs, and the array of
other associated challenges for both the abiotic and the biomass-
based CDR techniques, provide important context for the
discussions around further proposed measures for addressing
climate change, namely RFG.
Radiative forcing geoengineering
Numerous RFG techniques have been proposed, which can fun-
damentally be divided into three vertical deployment regions (see
Fig. 1): space-based (mirrors), atmospheric (stratospheric aerosol
injection – SAI; marine sky brightening – MSB; and cirrus cloud
thinning – CCT); and surface-based (urban areas, agricultural
land, grasslands, deserts, oceans, etc.).
A key reason for interest in RFG techniques is that they might
technically be able to stabilize or even reduce ΔTs within a few
years, although there would be technique-speciﬁc differences in
regional cooling (see Box 3). Proposed CDR techniques, on the
other hand, would likely physically require much longer (decades)
before they could lead to a notable stabilization or decrease in
ΔTs, due to limits on the maximum rate of CO2 removal that
could be achieved. Furthermore, although the operational costs
for all proposed RFG techniques are currently very uncertain,
considerable interest has been raised by the possibility67–71 that
the operational costs to achieve a certain degree of cooling, e.g.,
RFGref, might be much lower than the operational costs for a
comparable amount of CDR (e.g., achieving CDRref by 2100).
However, comparing costs is difﬁcult due to the different time
horizons: CDR has no further operational costs once the desired
amount of CO2 has been removed, whereas RFG would have
ongoing costs to maintain the same cooling as long as the elevated
CO2 levels persist (potentially over centuries). RFG has been
considered under various complementary framings, including
determining the forcing that would be needed to reduce ΔTs to
zero72, and limiting the magnitude of future peaks in ΔTs while
mitigation measures are implemented and CDR capacity is being
developed73,74.
In the context of the Paris Agreement, we focus our discussion
below on the three atmospheric RFG techniques (SAI, MSB, and
CCT), which current literature indicates would have the most
signiﬁcant physical potential to contribute notably over the next
few decades towards achieving the 1.5 or 2 °C temperature goals.
Space mirror RFG could contribute considerable cooling from a
climate physics perspective, based on model simulations using it
as a proxy for RFG in general75,76; however, proposals for
implementation77,78 rely on extensive future technology devel-
opments and a dramatic reduction in material transport costs
from ~10,000$/kg79 to less than 100$/kg. Furthermore, there are
signiﬁcant, poorly understood risks including impacts from
asteroids and space debris, and technical or communications
failure. As such, while a future possibility, due to present chal-
lenges and associated times scales, space mirror RFG is not fur-
ther considered here in the context of the Paris Agreement.
Furthermore, for proposed surface-based RFG techniques, a
recent literature assessment15 has shown that their potential
maximum cooling effects are either too limited (i.e., well below
RFGref), or are associated with substantial side effects, e.g.,
complete disruption of regional ecosystems such as in the deserts,
so that it is also unlikely that any current proposed surface-based
Box 3: RFG techniques: Key common effects, impacts and risks
An important component of the Paris Agreement framing is that there are many possible climatic manifestations of a world with the global mean
surface temperature increase ΔTs = 1.5 °C or 2 °C, with regional differences in temperature and precipitation, and thus differing impacts on society and
ecosystems. Implementation of RFG to complement mitigation would result in novel climates with regional climatic differences, since RFG has a
different inﬂuence on the vertical and horizontal distributions of radiative forcing than CO2 and other anthropogenic climate forcers2,14,16. However,
climate model simulations100,186 show that even for a relatively extreme case, e.g., wherein RFG were to reduce ΔTs from 3 °C to 1.5 °C, resulting
temperature and precipitation distributions are almost universally closer than the ΔTs = 3 °C climate to the ΔTs = 1.5 °C climate achieved through
mitigation alone, with only limited regional exceptions (mostly for maritime precipitation). Other model studies indicate that the simulated match to
target climates could be made even better with appropriately designed geographical distributions of the introduced forcing187–190, e.g., by combining
two or more techniques to capitalize on their regional differences in radiative forcing191,192. Under certain conditions, application of RFG in climate
model ensembles can result in reduced simulated climate risks simultaneously in nearly all regions worldwide194, although this involves assumptions
such as uninterrupted RFG deployment (i.e., no risk of failure or disruption).
The anticipated climate responses to most RFG techniques have been found to be similar in numerous climate modelling studies, particularly those
within the Geoengineering Model Intercomparison Project (GeoMIP)72,76,193. Roughly well-distributed global forcing, via space mirrors or SAI, is
expected to produce a pronounced latitudinal gradient in temperature response, with low latitudes cooling more than high latitudes. While this
tendency is also present in simulations of MSB, the regionally applied forcing can result in temperature changes that dominate over the latitudinal
gradient. Model simulations further show that RFG tends to cause the global mean precipitation rate to decrease disproportionately to
temperature75,194. However, despite many broad similarities, speciﬁc techniques also exhibit notable differences in simulations124,195, e.g., MSB and
desert brightening show very different precipitation responses relative to space mirrors and SAI117,119,121,196,197. Furthermore, in contrast to the solar
radiation based techniques, simulations of CCT compute the strongest cooling at high latitudes, dependent on exact locations of cirrus thinning133,135,
and an increase rather than a decrease in global precipitation136,137,191,195.
Despite a growing literature base of modelling studies such as those conducted within GeoMIP, understanding remains poor of the range of further
positive and negative impacts that RFG would have on the Earth system, and by extension on society. Some impacts will be technique speciﬁc (e.g., risk
of stratospheric ozone depletion caused by SAI151), but many will be common regardless of technique. Research from the impact assessment
community on the topic of RFG has thus far been very limited, leaving impacts uncharacterized for several key sectors198, especially: health, for instance
via changes in heatwaves, air quality and vector-borne diseases; food security, including crop yields and ﬁsh stocks; water resources, including effects of
droughts and ﬂooding; biodiversity and ecosystems (terrestrial and aquatic); and coasts, including inundation and erosion.
Finally, one of the most-discussed risks of RFG for Earth systems is the so-called termination shock. This refers to the rapid increase in temperature that
would result should a signiﬁcant amount of RFG (e.g., exceeding RFGref) be implemented and later stopped or scaled back over a short period of
time199,200, returning the climate to the same warmed state as would have occurred in the absence of RFG. This would present a particular challenge
for human populations and ecosystems, given that adaptation depends on both magnitude and rate of change200. Two measures have been proposed to
ensure that such a rapid warming is improbable: ﬁrst, signiﬁcant mitigation combined with CDR to produce net negative CO2 emissions, thus reducing
the amount of RFG that would be needed over time to keep ΔTs below a speciﬁc threshold (e.g., 2 °C); and second, careful development of backup
systems and policies201.
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RFG techniques will be employed to contribute signiﬁcantly to
achieving the Paris Agreement goals.
All of the proposed RFG techniques generally share several
aspects in common in terms of the anticipated climate responses
and the uncertainties and risks involved (see Box 3). Furthermore,
all three of the atmospheric RFG techniques would require
generating an enhanced aerosol layer or modiﬁed clouds
with geographical, optical, microphysical and chemical char-
acteristics capable of producing the desired radiative forcing.
This in turn requires consideration of the technique-speciﬁc
issues around how well different particle composition types
would work, how much would need to be injected, when and
where, and what the expected cooling would be, as discussed in
the following sections.
Stratospheric aerosol injection. Injecting reﬂecting aerosol
particles or gaseous particle precursors into the lower strato-
sphere could increase the planetary albedo (reﬂectivity), in turn
reducing surface temperatures. Discussions of SAI have a long
history26,80–84, with the earliest studies focusing on enhancing
the natural stratospheric sulfate aerosol layer. This could be
done via injection of either sulfate particles, or sulphuric acid
(H2SO4), which condenses into particles, or precursor gases
like sulfur dioxide (SO2), hydrogen sulﬁde (H2S) or carbonyl
sulﬁde (COS), which would then be oxidized to H2SO4.
Numerous other possible particle compositions have been pro-
posed and analyzed85–92, including: calcite (CaCO3, the main
component of limestone); crystal forms of titanium dioxide
(TiO2), zirconium dioxide (ZrO2), and aluminium oxide (Al2O3);
silicon carbide (SiC); synthetic diamond; soot; and self-
lofting nanoparticles. Each proposed material has its speciﬁc
advantages and challenges (see Fig. 4), e.g., calcite particles91 are
non-toxic, would not cause signiﬁcant stratospheric heating, and
may counteract stratospheric ozone loss, but their microphysics
and chemistry under stratospheric conditions are poorly
understood.
Based on fundamental physical considerations, the radiative
forcing by SAI would be expected to have an asymptotic limit,
due to the growth of stratospheric particles to larger radii at
greater injection rates, decreasing the residence time (due to
increased sedimentation rates) and the optical efﬁciency.
Estimates of this limit vary widely, especially due to differences
in the representations of microphysics and dynamics in climate
models. Model studies93–95, as well as evidence from past volcanic
eruptions2, indicate a maximum potential cooling (negative
radiative forcing) ranging from 2W/m2 to over 5W/m2, i.e.,
well above RFGref, though the upper end of the range would
require extremely large injection amounts (comparable to the
current global anthropogenic sulfur pollutant emissions of about
100 Tg(SO2)/yr).
SAI would require regular injections to maintain the aerosol
layer, given the stratospheric particle residence time of about 1–3
years96–98. The injection amount needed would depend on the
desired radiative forcing and the particle composition, size
distribution, optical properties, and the vertical and horizontal
injection location(s)94,96,98–102. Most model studies (as well as
evidence from the volcanic record) show that the radiative forcing
efﬁciency typically increases with the altitude of injection94,96,99,
since a smaller fraction of the particle mass is lost due to
sedimentation97; however, this is not found in all studies95, and
may depend on the injection amount, even reversing sign for very
large injection rates93. Geographically, injection in the tropics
results in an effective dispersion towards the poles by the
stratospheric Brewer–Dobson circulation, producing an aerosol
layer with a broad global coverage99, but limited control over its
regional distribution. On the other hand, model simulations have
shown that high latitude injections aimed speciﬁcally at reducing
Arctic warming would be relatively ineffective103–107, due to the
shorter aerosol residence time and weaker solar radiation
compared to the tropics.
Proposed injection mechanisms for SAI are via high-ﬂying
aircraft, stratospheric balloons, artillery shells, and rock-
ets68,69,108,109, with studies to date indicating the ﬁrst two are
likely the most effective and economically feasible. All are in very
early stages of research and development. Aircraft injections
would require a new ﬂeet of dedicated high-ﬂying aircraft69, since
civil aircraft ﬂy too low and mostly too far north to be effective
for global cooling109. Tethered balloons would require extensive
technology development and testing to determine the feasibility
and safety issues involved in annually transporting megatons of
particles or precursors through hoses of over 20 km length68.
Furthermore, for both platforms, coagulating particles or
precursors like H2SO4 would likely require some mechanism to
create turbulence in order to have sufﬁcient control over the
resulting particle size distribution (see Fig. 4a), and a large
number of aircraft or tethered balloons would thus be needed in
order to limit the local injection rate and prevent rapid
coagulation to oversized particles98.
Marine sky brightening. MSB would involve seeding low-altitude
clouds with cloud condensation nuclei particles to cause con-
densed water to spread over a greater number of smaller droplets,
increasing the optical cross section and thus the cloud’s
reﬂectivity110–113. This effect has been observed over oceangoing
ships due to particles in their pollution plumes114, and in plumes
of effusive volcanic eruptions115. Clouds with lower background
particle concentrations, such as maritime stratiform clouds, are
particularly susceptible to this effect. Modeling studies111,116–118
indicate the injected particles would also likely increase the clear-
sky reﬂectivity, by an amount comparable to the marine cloud
brightening (MCB), which has led to the combined term MSB.
Similar to SAI, the limited knowledge about key microphysical
and dynamical processes involved results in a large uncertainty in
the maximum cooling that could be achieved via MSB, with
estimates111,113,117,119–122 ranging from 0.8 to 5.4 W/m2, i.e.,
likely well above RFGref. Analysis of satellite data113 and model
simulations111,113,115 indicate that certain regions are more
susceptible to MSB, in particular persistent stratocumulus cloud
decks off the continental west coasts, especially South America,
North America, southern Africa and Australia. However, there
are considerable scientiﬁc uncertainties, such as the differences in
responses of open and closed cell convection123. The cooling
resulting from MSB would be more geographically heterogeneous
than from SAI117,124, focused especially on the susceptible
oceanic regions, leading to considerably different temperature
and precipitation responses in comparison to more globally
homogeneous forcing.
For implementation, the focus has been on injecting sea salt
due to its availability, especially from autonomous ships67. Several
challenges would need to be overcome, including: development
of spray nozzles to form appropriately sized particles125;
compensating for reduced lofting in the marine boundary layer
due to cooling following evaporation of injected seawater126,127;
and an ability to target suitable meteorological conditions,
including low solar zenith angles, unpolluted air, and few or
no overlying mid to high altitude clouds112,113,128. Efforts would
also be needed to minimize environmental effects (i.e.,
corrosion and detriment to vegetation129) and chemical and
microphysical effects (on ambient gases and particles130) of the
injected sea-salt.
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Cirrus cloud thinning. Cirrus, in contrast to most other forms of
clouds, warm the Earth’s surface by absorption and re-radiation
of terrestrial radiation on average more than they cool by
reﬂecting solar radiation back to space2. CCT would aim to
reduce this net warming by injecting highly effective ice nuclei
into cirrus, causing the freezing of supercooled water droplets and
inducing growth to large ice particles that sediment rapidly out of
the clouds, reducing the mean cirrus cloud thickness and
lifetime131–134. Since CCT would primarily target terrestrial
radiation, in contrast to SAI and MSB, it may more directly
counteract radiative forcing by anthropogenic greenhouse gases,
though the degree of compensation would be limited by the
geographical distribution of susceptible cirrus135.
The relatively close balance between a large gross warming and
cooling by cirrus clouds, in contrast to the dominance of gross
cooling for marine stratocumulus clouds and most aerosol
particles under consideration for MSB and SAI, makes estimating
a maximum radiative forcing potential even more challenging. A
maximum net cooling in the range of 2–3.5W/m2, considerably
exceeding RFGref, has been computed based on model
simulations131,132,135–137, though the high end of this range is
accomplished by modiﬁcations in the models which are far
removed from what could likely be achieved in reality (e.g.,
increasing the cirrus particle fall speeds 8–10-fold everywhere).
On the other hand, some studies138,139 have found that CCT
might not work at all, or might even produce a net warming. In
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Fig. 4 Key scientiﬁc and technical considerations and challenges for stratospheric aerosol injection (SAI). A wide range of scientiﬁc and technical factors
would need to be considered in choosing which particle composition or combination of particle types to employ in possible implementation of SAI: a A high
degree of control would be desired over the resulting aerosol particle size distribution, which inﬂuences the aerosol layer optical properties (for both solar
and terrestrial radiation), the residence time, and the dispersion and transport of the aerosol layer. Such control would be more straightforward with
manufactured particles such as TiO2, ZrO2, and Al2O3, than for H2SO4 or gaseous precursor injections (SO2, etc.). b Particle types that have limited effects
on the stratospheric ozone layer would be preferable, which is a particular disadvantage of sulfate particles151,152. c Limited heating of the lower
stratosphere would be preferable. Heating would depend on particle composition86, with some particle types, especially soot88 and small Al2O3 particles92,
possibly heating the polar stratosphere by 10 °C or more, with signiﬁcant but poorly understood impacts on stratospheric water vapour and
dynamics90,92,93,153,154, including the possibility of increased stratospheric particle lifetime due to lofting95. d Particles with a high radiative forcing
efﬁciency per unit mass would be preferable, as this would reduce the particle or precursor mass that needs to be transported to the stratosphere. e SAI
would affect the ratio of direct and diffuse solar radiation, which would in turn impact photosynthesis, and thus crop yields155 and global net primary
productivity156. Little is known yet about how this varies with particle type and size, or about other possible effects on ecosystems, as well as on solar
energy production. f Human safety and environmental impact issues are of concern for several particle compositions, e.g., H2SO4 is a powerful acid, while
aluminium and several other proposed particle components are well-known environmental contaminants, though their effective toxicity depends on their
speciﬁc chemical forms; this is generally less of a concern for most proposed gaseous precursors like SO2
NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1038/s41467-018-05938-3 REVIEW ARTICLE
NATURE COMMUNICATIONS |  (2018) 9:3734 | DOI: 10.1038/s41467-018-05938-3 | www.nature.com/naturecommunications 11
particular, there is a risk of ‘over-seeding’, i.e., forming new cirrus
clouds due to seeding material being released in cloud-free regions,
which would have a warming effect, working against the desired
cooling132,138,139. Furthermore, recent ﬁndings of extensive hetero-
geneous nucleation in tropical anvil cirrus140 possibly rules out
tropical cirrus for seeding134, since seeding would only be effective
in an environment where a signiﬁcant fraction of the natural
freezing occurs via homogeneous nucleation (i.e., freezing of
supercooled droplets without ice nuclei). Thus the focus of CCT
studies is on the middle and high latitudes, where model simulations
and satellite data indicate it would likely be most effective132–134.
Like SAI and MSB, CCT would require regular injection of
seeding material, which would settle out with the cirrus cloud
particles. Proposed seeding materials include bismuth tri-iodide
(BiI3)131, which was historically investigated for weather
modiﬁcation programs and found to be a highly effective material
for ice nuclei, though toxic. Sea salt may also be a candidate, as it
is readily available and non-toxic, and has been found to function
as an ice nuclei141, though considerably less effective than BiI3.
The particle injections would likely require dedicated aircraft or
unmanned drones to provide sufﬁcient control over the seeding
locations, which would need to be targeted at existing susceptible
cirrus clouds. Due to the likelihood of over-seeding in cloud-free
regions132, seeding via commercial aircraft can essentially be
ruled out.
Research needs for RFG. While current scientiﬁc knowledge of
the three atmospheric RFG techniques discussed above indicates
Stratospheric aerosol injection (SAI)
Δ 
R
F
Concentration
Marine sky brightening (MSB)
Aerosol growth + sizes
Effectiveness:
and particle concentrations 
Growth: dependence on coagulation 
Characteristics: dependence on 
aerosol chemical composition
Impact of meteorological  conditions
Cirrus cloud thinning (CCT)
CCTSAI
Aerosol-cloud interaction
Impact on optical properties 
Reflectivity of
solar radiation 
Absorptivity of 
terrestrial radiation
Effects on cloud 
lifetimes and amounts
H2SO4 CaCO3 NaCl BiI3
a 
b
Fig. 5 Key aerosol and cloud microphysics issues involved in atmospheric RFG techniques. For SAI, MSB and CCT, the aerosol and cloud microphysics
involved are poorly understood and challenging to simulate – one of the main hindrances to conﬁdently predicting the potential climate effects. a The size
distribution of the injected or produced aerosol particles inﬂuences their effectiveness. As illustrated for SAI, initial studies indicate that there is an optimal
particle size (estimated at r ≈ 0.25 μm98); much smaller particles do not effectively reﬂect sunlight, while much larger particles sediment out too quickly to
produce a signiﬁcant time-integrated radiative forcing. Simulations indicate that MSB has a smaller optimal particle size (r ≈ 0.13 μm), and oversized
particles could even lead to a warming instead of cooling122,157. CCT is instead mainly affected by the injected particle concentration, with an optimum
around 20/l, while excessive concentrations (greater than 100/l) could lead to warming132. The size distributions and particle concentrations in turn
depend on the particle growth characteristics98,158,159, for which coagulation is a particularly important and uncertain factor. Chemical composition also
inﬂuences the aerosol optical properties, but considerable research is needed to better understand this. Similarly, few studies have investigated the
dependence on the ambient meteorological conditions, including turbulence, the susceptibility of clouds to formation of precipitation128,160 (for MSB), and
the spectrum of vertical velocities, which affects the activation of cloud condensation nuclei and ice nuclei (for MSB and CCT). b An additional complexity
for MSB and CCT is introduced by the aerosol-cloud interactions. The impacts of aerosol particles on cloud optical properties are very difﬁcult to simulate
in both cloud-resolving and global climate models, and have been repeatedly highlighted by the IPCC2 as one of the most signiﬁcant uncertainties involved
in climate change predictions. The chemical composition of the aerosol particles inﬂuences their effectiveness as cloud condensation nuclei (MSB) and ice
nuclei (CCT). Finally, aerosol particles can affect cloud lifetimes, especially for MSB, since reducing the size of the cloud droplets can increase the lifetime
of the clouds before they form precipitation, but can in turn reduce the lifetime by making them more susceptible to evaporation
REVIEW ARTICLE NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1038/s41467-018-05938-3
12 NATURE COMMUNICATIONS |  (2018) 9:3734 | DOI: 10.1038/s41467-018-05938-3 | www.nature.com/naturecommunications
that they might physically be able to contribute signiﬁcantly
towards reducing global mean temperatures, any large-scale
implementation would likely require several decades, due to the
considerable uncertainties and scientiﬁc research and develop-
ment needs, along with the extensive considerations needed for a
range of socio-political issues (see Box 1). Many of the research
and development needs are generally in common across the
atmospheric RFG techniques, in four broad categories. First, the
associated geographical heterogeneities and side effects on various
Earth systems (see Box 3) need to be much better characterized.
Second, in terms of process understanding, perhaps the most
signiﬁcant general challenge in common to all three techniques is
developing a greater understanding of the associated aerosol and
cloud microphysics (Fig. 5).
Third, a much better understanding is needed of the
implementation costs, which have been proposed by some to be
a factor of 10–1000 lower than the corresponding annual costs of
CDR techniques. Initial estimates67–69,108 for development and
installation costs for SAI via aircraft and tethered balloon
injection systems and for MSB by unmanned ships are all in
the range of $1–100 billion, with annual maintenance costs for
SAI estimated at $20 billion or possibly even less. No published
estimates are yet available for the operational costs of CCT by
aircraft deployment, since the associated physical mechanism is
still too poorly understood, pointing to an important future
research need. An additional challenge to estimating the
operational costs for RFG is the need to account for the long
timescale over which it might be applied to uphold the Paris
Agreement temperature goals, if not accompanied by simulta-
neous strong mitigation and CDR.
And fourth, establishing a more robust knowledge base for any
of the proposed techniques would require eventually moving
beyond theoretical, modelling, satellite-based and proxy data
studies to also including in situ ﬁeld experiments. Thus far, only
two scientiﬁcally rigorous, dedicated, in situ, perturbative ﬁeld
experiments have been conducted related to the atmospheric RFG
techniques142,143, focusing on marine stratus microphysics,
though not explicitly focused on MSB. However, considerable
work has been done recently on developing numerous concepts
for a variety of ﬁeld experiments112,144,145. These proposals have
been anticipated to raise considerable public concern, and thus
have been closely accompanied by governance development
efforts (see Box 1).
Summary and outlook
Among the CDR techniques in Fig. 1, BECCS, DACCS, enhanced
weathering and ocean alkalinisation are likely physically capable
of removing more than CDRref (650 Gt(CO2)) in this century,
while afforestation, biochar production and burial, soil carbon
enrichment and OIF all have an upper bound for physical
removal capacity that is a signiﬁcant fraction of CDRref, though
all would involve signiﬁcant implementation costs and in most
cases substantial negative side effects. For RFG, in the context and
timescales of the Paris Agreement, likely only SAI, CCT and MSB
have the technical potential to physically provide a global cooling
that signiﬁcantly exceeds RFGref (0.6 W/m2). Space mirrors and
surface-based techniques would be anticipated to face prohibitive
constraints including logistics, costs, timescales, and ecosystem
side effects.
Any climate geoengineering technique would likely require
several decades to develop to a scale comparable to CDRref or
RFGref. For CDR, extensive global infrastructure development
would be needed, along with resolving governance issues,
including competition with other sectors like agriculture. For
RFG, improving the scientiﬁc understanding (e.g., microphysical
details) and developing delivery technologies and effective gov-
ernance mechanisms would all be essential. For both CDR and
RFG, these developments would require public and political
support, especially for public investments given their technical
and economic uncertainty at the scales of CDRref or RFGref. Given
the meagre knowledge surrounding technique scalability, at pre-
sent only indicative orders of magnitude can be given for costs:
approximately $100/t(CO2) for CDR techniques (i.e., over $800
billion/yr to achieve CDRref between 2020 and 2100); and pos-
sibly as low as $10 billion/yr for the atmospheric RFG techniques
to provide RFGref, though such low costs may never be achievable
due to technological challenges upon scaling up. There are of
course also numerous social and environmental impacts and
associated costs (e.g., Figs. 3–4, and Box 1) that are currently only
very roughly characterized in the literature.
In the context of their role in the Paris Agreement, and more
generally in climate policy, climate geoengineering technologies
may eventually become part of a signiﬁcant socio-technical
imaginary146–148, within which speciﬁc visions of the future are
made to appear desirable, and which are inﬂuential on present
political developments. Climate geoengineering is already enter-
ing the collective imagination149, e.g., as portrayed through media
reports, and is also entering climate policy discussions, for
instance through inclusion in the IPCC assessment reports2, and
especially through the extensive reliance on CDR in low-carbon
future scenarios analyzed by the IPCC18,19. Relatedly, the concept
of the Anthropocene, with its emphasis on the planetary impact
of human activities, may further normalize climate geoengineer-
ing technologies as potential tools for conscious planetary man-
agement. However, none of the proposed CDR or RFG
techniques exist yet at a climate-relevant scale, and given the
challenges discussed here, it is not yet certain that any of the
individual techniques could ever be scaled up to the level of
CDRref or RFGref. Avoiding a premature normalization of the
hypothetical climate geoengineering techniques in science, society
and politics would require actively opening up discussions to
critical questioning and reframing.
We highlight three steps regarding future considerations of
climate geoengineering in the context of the Paris Agreement.
First, early development of effective governance—including for
research—could be designed to reduce the likelihood and extent
of potential injustices (see Box 1) and allow supporters and critics
of climate geoengineering technologies to voice their concerns.
Second, further disciplinary and interdisciplinary research could
help to reduce the large uncertainties in the anticipated climate
effects, side effects, costs, and technical implementation and
societal aspects of the individual techniques. Legitimizing such
research would require transdisciplinary processes involving sta-
keholders from the scientiﬁc and policy communities, civil
society, and the public, especially in making decisions regarding
potential large scale research programs. Ensuring such broad
involvement is a major challenge for effective governance.
National and international efforts to foster deliberation and
coordinate any future large scale research may help to reduce
some of the socio-political risks, especially the moral hazard risk
of distracting from or deterring climate mitigation. Such coor-
dination could also serve to reduce redundant work and channel
research towards issues that are determined to be priorities for
informing current and upcoming decision-making processes.
Finally, based on the current knowledge reviewed here, pro-
posed climate geoengineering techniques cannot be relied on to
be able to make signiﬁcant contributions, e.g., at the levels of
CDRref or RFGref, towards counteracting climate change in the
context of the Paris Agreement. Even if climate geoengineering
techniques were ever actively pursued, and eventually worked as
envisioned on global scales, they would very unlikely be
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implementable prior to the second half of the century15. Given
the rather modest degree of intended global mitigation efforts
currently reﬂected in the NDCs (Fig. 2 and Supplementary
Table 1), this would very likely be too late to sufﬁciently coun-
teract the warming due to increasing levels of CO2 and other
climate forcers to stay within the 1.5 °C temperature limit—and
probably even the 2 °C limit—especially if mitigation efforts after
2030 do not substantially exceed the planned efforts of the next
decade. Thus at present, the only reliable way to attain a high
probability of achieving the Paris Agreement goals requires
considerably increasing mitigation efforts beyond the current
plans, including starting extensive emissions reductions much
sooner than in the current NDCs.
Methods
Parameters in supplementary Table 1 and Fig. 2. Supplementary Table 1 pro-
vides values for four key parameters, based on the Paris Agreement Nationally
Determined Contributions (NDCs) until 2030 and assumed annual decrease rates
of the emissions beyond that (or starting in 2021 for one case): (1) the annual CO2
emissions rates in 2030 and 2100; (2) the cumulative CO2 emissions for 2015–2030,
2031–2100, and 2015–2100; (3) the gaps between the cumulative CO2 emissions
and the remaining budgets of cumulative emissions (using 2015 as a reference
starting date) that are consistent with the temperature limits of 1.5 and 2 °C; and
(4) the approximate equivalent radiative forcing amounts that these emissions gaps
represent. Figure 2 provides a graphical depiction of the cumulative CO2 emissions
gaps and the equivalent radiative forcing gaps. The computations for these are
described here, followed by a few overarching issues.
Annual CO2 emissions. The annual CO2 emissions rates in 2030 are based on a
recent reassessment of the current NDCs9, which takes a more direct approach
than several previous studies that are based on analyses with integrated assessment
models8,150, arriving at a best estimate value of 51 Gt(CO2)/yr, which is 10–20%
higher than most previous studies, while the lower bound value of 43 Gt(CO2)/yr
computed by ref. 9 is similar to the best estimate values of most previous studies.
To reﬂect this range of estimated future emissions, in Supplementary Table 1 we
give a ± range that represents these lower bound and best estimate values based on
the data from ref. 9.
The annual CO2 emissions rates, especially in 2100, are relevant for considering
the subsidiary Paris Agreement goal of achieving net zero CO2 emissions during
the second half of the century. Since the natural sink of CO2 (0.8–1.1 Gt(CO2)/yr52)
is small compared to current anthropogenic emissions, and already largely
balanced over longer time scales by natural CO2 sources such as volcanic activity2,
achieving net zero CO2 emissions would require sufﬁcient CDR to essentially
completely compensate the anthropogenic CO2 emissions rate.
If actual CO2 emissions in 2030 are outside the range expected based on the
current NDCs (i.e., the NDCs are either not achieved, or efforts exceed current
commitments), then for the ﬁrst four cases in Supplementary Table 1 (with
emissions reductions starting in 2031), the subsequent emissions rates and
cumulative emissions will scale linearly with the relative difference in 2030 (e.g.,
10% lower emissions in 2030 imply 10% lower emissions in 2100 and 10% lower
cumulative emissions from 2031–2100).
Cumulative CO2 emissions. The cumulative emissions for 2015–2030 in Sup-
plementary Table 1 are computed based on the annual emissions data from ref.9,
separately for the pathways based on the lower bound and best estimate values
(from which the means and ± ranges are computed). For 2031–2100, for the case
with constant annual emissions the cumulative emissions are simply computed as
70 times the lower and upper bound values for the annual emissions. For the cases
with an annual decrease from 2031 onwards, individual pathways until 2100,
starting from the lower and upper bound values in 2030, are calculated as Ey=
(1−r) * Ey-1, where Ey is the emissions rate for the current year, Ey−1 for the
previous year, and r is the annual emissions reduction factor (0.01, 0.03, or 0.05).
The annual emissions along each pathway are then summed to obtain the
cumulative emissions for 2031–2100. The same procedure is also applied to the
ﬁfth case in Fig. 2 and Supplementary Table 1, with a 3% annual reduction starting
in 2021, for which the 2015–2030 cumulative emissions range is recalculated
accordingly. In all cases, emissions reductions and the resultant cumulative emis-
sions and implications for radiative forcing and global mean temperature increase
are only considered until 2100.
Gaps to the remaining CO2 budgets. Various approaches have been applied to
determine the remaining budgets of cumulative emissions of CO2 (and non-CO2
forcers) which are consistent with likely limiting global warming to various tem-
perature thresholds. Each of these has various drawbacks. We describe a few of
these here, as a background to why we have developed a simple, novel approach
that is suited for this analysis. In one approach, the IPCC3 found that a cumulative
CO2 budget of 400 Gt(CO2) from 2011 onwards likely keeps 21st century ΔTs
below 1.5 °C, which can be adjusted to ~240 Gt(CO2) for 2015 onwards at the
current global emissions rate of just over 40 Gt(CO2)/yr6. This would already be
exhausted in 2020, which seems unlikely given that current global warming is
approximately 1 °C, and the ﬁnding by the IPCC WG12 that if anthropogenic CO2
emissions were abruptly stopped, the global mean temperature would likely remain
approximately constant for decades (due to a balancing of opposing factors). Using
another approach3, the IPCC concluded that the cumulative emissions budget from
1870 onwards that is consistent with likely keeping ΔTs below 1.5 °C is 2250 Gt
(CO2). Comparing this directly with the Global Carbon Project’s current estimate
of historical cumulative emissions, which is 2235 ± 240 Gt(CO2) for 1870–2017,
would also imply that the 1.5 °C budget has already been or will very soon be
exhausted. This comparison makes one of the main problems with this approach
clear: it is based on the small difference between two large and uncertain numbers.
Recognizing this problem, the Global Carbon Project concludes6: “…extreme
caution is needed if using our updated cumulative emission estimate to determine
the ‘remaining carbon budget’ to stay below given temperature limits4. We suggest
estimating the remaining carbon budget by integrating scenario data from the
current time to some time in the future as proposed recently5.” The application of
this alternate approach by ref.5 results in much higher estimates than the IPCC
approaches: likely more than 880 Gt(CO2) and 1870 Gt(CO2) (from 2015 onwards)
for 1.5 and 2 °C5. However, this is associated with several assumptions, which have
been strongly criticized7, as noted in the main text.
For the purpose of our analysis we apply a similar though simpler approach,
which is independent of the historical emissions and is straightforward to apply to
any moderate temperature difference (e.g., 0.5 or 1 °C), and allows us to apply an
uncertainty range to the current value of ΔTs. We ﬁrst consider the cumulative
budgets from 1870 onwards that were found by the IPCC3 to be consistent with
likely limiting global warming to three temperature thresholds: 2250 Gt(CO2) for
1.5 °C, 2900 Gt(CO2) for 2 °C, and 4200 Gt(CO2) for 3 °C, where the simulated
warming includes effects of co-emitted non-CO2 forcers. These three cumulative
budget values make the quasi-linear response of simulated temperature to
cumulative CO2 emissions very clear, with a slope of 1 °C for every 1300 Gt(CO2)
between any pair of these temperature thresholds.
This slope is then applied to determine the remaining CO2 budget between any
two values of ΔTs. There is a notable uncertainty in the current value of ΔTs
7, given
interannual and interdecadal variability, as well as the uneven geographical
coverage of the global observations network, and other factors such as the reference
starting date (i.e., what counts as pre-industrial), etc. Here we make use of the
analysis in ref. 7 and apply a current value of ΔTs = 1.0 ± 0.1 °C, which accounts for
the biased geographical coverage of the measurements network, especially the
relatively few long-term temperature observations in the rapidly warming Arctic,
and is thus higher than the value of ΔTs = 0.9 °C applied by ref. 5. Note that a small
additional uncertainty is present in further factors, such as using the mid-1700s
rather than the late 1800s as a reference period for pre-industrial temperatures. We
do not take these additional factors into account, in order to remain comparable to
the IPCC and other analysis that apply the late 1800s reference period; however, we
note that this and other unaccounted factors could increase the current value of
ΔTs by up to ~0.15 °C, reducing the remaining budgets by up to ~200 Gt(CO2),
which is a comparatively small uncertainty in light of the broad ranges of values in
Fig. 2 and Supplementary Table 1.
Applying a current value of ΔTs = 1.0 ± 0.1 °C and the slope of 1 °C per 1300 Gt
(CO2) cumulative emissions yields a value of 650 ± 130 Gt(CO2) from 2015
onwards for the remaining budget consistent with likely limiting ΔTs to 1.5 °C, and
1300 ± 130 Gt(CO2) for 2 °C. These remaining budget values are then subtracted
from the projected emissions for the different cases to determine the gaps in the
cumulative emissions budgets, giving an indication of how much CDR might be
invoked in an attempt to compensate the emissions gaps in order to still achieve the
Paris Agreement temperature goals. These resulting values are depicted in Fig. 2
and listed in Supplementary Table 1.
Equivalent radiative forcing amounts. Finally, in order to derive an indication of
what these cumulative emissions gaps would imply for the amount of negative
radiative forcing that would be needed to limit ΔTs to a given threshold, we can
make use of the climate sensitivity simulated by model ensembles to convert from
the CO2 emissions budget gaps (in Gt(CO2)) to equivalent radiative forcing in
W/m2. For this, we use the slope noted above of 1 °C for every 1300 Gt(CO2), or
7.7 × 10–4 °C/Gt(CO2), and combine this with the best estimate value from the
IPCC2 for the equilibrium climate sensitivity of λ ≈ 0.8 °C/(W/m2) (corresponding
to a mean equilibrium warming of 3 °C for a radiative forcing of 3.7 W/m2 from a
doubling of CO2 since preindustrial times), or inverted, 1.25 (W/m2)/°C. Together
these give 9.6 × 10–4 (W/m2)/Gt(CO2) (or approximately 1W/m2 for every
thousand Gt(CO2)), which we apply to obtain the values listed in the ﬁnal row of
Supplementary Table 1. We note that this is only an approximate conversion, since
the individual climate sensitivity components were derived from different model
ensemble simulations designed for different purposes, but it is adequate for the
purpose of providing orientation values for the radiative forcing that may be called
for from proposed RFG techniques in the context of achieving the Paris Agreement
goals, particularly in comparison to the possible equivalent CO2 budget con-
tributions from CDR.
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General issues. There are several general issues important for interpreting and
applying Fig. 2 and Supplementary Table 1. First, it is important to note that a
small amount of CDR is already assumed in some NDCs, in particular by China,
India, Russia, the USA and Canada (in contrast to the statement by ref.29 that
“none of the NDCs contains plans to develop negative emissions”). However, to the
extent that information is available in the data used in ref.9, the amounts assumed
by individual nations are very small, each less than 10 Gt(CO2) by 2030, so that
only a few percent of the cumulative global emissions from now until 2030 are
represented by CDR in the current NDCs. Given this small fraction, and the
complexity of determining factors such as the exact amounts and timing that are
assumed (which is often not transparent in the data), we do not attempt to account
for these explicitly in our calculations. However, methodologically we note that the
CDR amounts discussed in the present study are in addition to the small amounts
of CDR that are already assumed in the current NDCs.
One of the most challenging issues to account for in such budget calculations is
the role of non-CO2 forcers, including the short-lived climate forcers (SLCFs),
which is often not possible to do consistently due to differences in their treatment
between different studies, as well as frequently a lack of detailed information about
how they were treated in individual studies. Throughout Fig. 2 and Supplementary
Table 1 and the main text of this study, we work in units of CO2 emissions, which
in many cases are converted from values given in the original publications in units
of equivalent CO2 (“CO2e”), which accounts for the CO2-equivalent radiative
forcing contribution of globally co-emitted SLCFs and other non-CO2 forcers. The
radiative forcing from SLCFs has been shown by the IPCC2 and in numerous
individual studies to be an important component in achieving ambitious
temperature goals like those in the Paris Agreement. The SLCFs are also important
due to the regional differences in their distributions: even though the non-CO2
forcers are responsible for a relatively small net radiative forcing, this is the result of
considerably larger and regionally differing gross warming and cooling effects
partly cancelling each other out globally. The notable regional differences in the
radiative forcing may in turn be important in calculating the detailed impacts of
proposed CDR and RFG techniques. Furthermore, focused efforts on the
reductions of speciﬁc SLCFs, e.g., black carbon or sulfate aerosols, could result in
rapid changes in their atmospheric levels, and thus could notably shift the net
global radiative forcing by non-CO2 forcers in one direction or another, again
impacting the calculated effects of climate geoengineering measures. On the other
hand, since CO2 is much longer-lived, its levels accumulate in the atmosphere over
centuries, while SLCFs are naturally removed within a timescale of a few days to a
few decades after they are emitted. Thus, in the high-ambition, low-carbon
pathways which are of most relevance for achieving the Paris Agreement goals with
no or very limited use of CDR and/or RFG, the SLCFs play a particularly important
role, whereas in the higher carbon pathways for which the discussion of CDR and
possibly RFG will become more intense, the forcing by CO2 will tend to dominate
more strongly over the SLCFs and other non-CO2 forcers. Thus, while it is
important to account for the non-CO2 forcers, especially in consideration of
achieving the 1.5 °C or 2 °C goals via mitigation alone, they will likely play a
diminishing role speciﬁcally in the cases where CDR and possibly RFG will be most
strongly invoked. This is important to bear in mind as background for the
treatment of SLCFs in this study (i.e., for the data in Fig. 2 and Supplementary
Table 1).
For the SLCFs, we ﬁnd that in the emissions data for 2015–2030 from ref.9, the
ratio of CO2e to CO2 is calculated to remain nearly constant during this period
(ranging from 1.31 to 1.33). This allows a straightforward conversion using a factor
of 1.32 between CO2e and CO2, but also reﬂects the uncertainty in the evolution of
non-CO2 forcer emissions (especially SLCFs), which are often approached very
simply (e.g., assuming they will either remain constant or their forcing ratio to CO2
will remain constant). This introduces an uncertainty in the results in Fig. 2 and
Supplementary Table 1, since it is likely that the relative role of the non-CO2
forcers will change from what is currently reﬂected in the NDCs. Nevertheless,
given that the factor of 1.32 implies a current net contribution of non-CO2 forcers
to global radiative forcing of about 25%, along with the arguments above we do not
expect the temporal changes in this ratio to make any qualitative differences in the
results and ranges reﬂected in Fig. 2 and Supplementary Table 1.
Finally, for readability, and given the uncertainties described in the data and
assumptions employed for the calculations for Fig. 2 and Supplementary Table 1,
all values below 100 in Supplementary Table 1 are rounded to two signiﬁcant
ﬁgures, and above 100 are rounded to the nearest tens (while exact values are used
for Fig. 2).
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